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COMMENT
SUPERPOKED AND SERVED: SERVICE OF PROCESS
VIA SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
I. INTRODUCTION
Who doesn't love those familiar Facebook notifications? "Elly
Pepper tagged you in four photos." "Stephen Taylor requested to
be your friend." "The lending company secured a default judg-
ment against you; you have 30 days to pack your bags!"
If you thought that last one sounded out of place, think again.
On December 12, 2008, in "what appears to be a [world] first,"
Master David Harper of the Supreme Court of the Australian
Capital Territory authorized service of a default judgment via the
social networking site Facebook.1
1. Nick Abrahams, Australian Court Serves Documents via Facebook, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/12/12/
1228585107578.html. The defendant couple had defaulted on a $150,000 home refinancing
loan. Noel Towell, Lawyers To Serve Notices on Facebook, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec.
16, 2008, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/12/16/1229189579001.html.
After the couple failed to appear in court, lawyers for the lending company applied to the
court for a judgment for the loan amount and for possession of the defendants' home. Id.
The court granted default judgment on October 31, 2008. Id.
Australian law required that the lending company locate the defendants and serve them
with notice of the judgment. Id. Although notification of default generally requires person-
al service or mailing the judgment to a defendant's home, Australian courts had previously
authorized substituted service via e-mail and even by text message to a defendant's mobile
phone. Id.
Lawyers for the plaintiff lending company published notice in The Canberra Times and
hired private investigators to serve the judgment. Id. After eleven failed attempts to find
the couple at their home between November 8 and December 6, the lawyers applied to the
Supreme Court to serve notice of the judgment via Facebook. Id. The Facebook profiles of
the defendants showed the defendants' names, dates of birth, and e-mail addresses. Id.
Additionally, the friend lists of the co-defendants showed that the co-defendants were
friends with one another. Id. On this evidence, the lawyers satisfied the judge that the
profiles were those of the defendants. Id.
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The Australian case represents the reality that the judiciary,
both domestic and abroad, has "begun to accept electronic me-
thods of communication."2 Litigation processes have developed in
response to innovative methods in information processing.3 This
comment will focus on one specific procedural aspect which has
been so affected: service of process.
American law has evolved to permit service of process via te-
lex,4 fax,5 and, most recently, e-mail.6 Facebook, which started as
a social networking site for college students,7 is one of the latest
innovations in electronic communication to take the world by
storm .
This comment explores the propriety of service of process via
social networking sites such as Facebook under American federal
law.9 Parts II through V provide the analytical framework for
analyzing this novel method of effectuating service of process.
Specifically, Part II outlines the fundamental requirements of due
process and Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part
III explores the evolution of service of process mechanisms, but
reserves service via e-mail for discussion in Part IV. Part V ad-
dresses electronic service abroad, most notably service pursuant
to the Hague Convention. Part VI provides a critical analysis of
the potential for service of process via Facebook. Finally, Part VII
concludes that service of process through Facebook may be per-
missible under Rule 4(f)(3) for serving elusive defendants abroad,
and that, although Facebook has a number of weighty limitations,
such service would not constitute a per se violation of due process.
2. Jeremy A. Colby, You've Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Elec-
tronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 381-82 (2003).
3. Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?: E-Mail and (Due) Service of Process,
51 S.C. L. REV. 227, 227-28 (2000) [hereinafter Tamayo, Are you Being Served?] (noting
the advent of electronic court filing systems, admission of electronic documents as evi-
dence, and expanded notions of service of process).
4. See, e.g., Cooper v. Church of Scientology of Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 786 (D. Mass.
1982).
5. See, e.g., In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. 713, 720-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2000).
6. See, e.g., Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
7. See Soraya Nadia McDonald, Making College Friends Easy as Point and Click,
WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005, at A9.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 195-200.
9. The propriety of the Australian ruling under Australian law is beyond the scope of
this comment.
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II. DUE PROCESS AND RULE 4
The requirement that plaintiffs give notice to defendants of
claims against them has existed in some form for over 4,000
years.10 As far as American law is concerned, notice is "a funda-
mental procedural component of commencing litigation."1 Serv-
ing notice provides a defendant with notice of a claim against him
and allows him the opportunity to appear to defend his inter-
ests.12 "Both personal jurisdiction and proper [notice] must exist
in order for a court to exercise its authority over a defendant." 3
Expanding notions of personal jurisdiction over the years cata-
lyzed corresponding changes in the scope of permissible service of
process. 4 In 1878, the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff held
that effective service of process for in personam actions required
that the defendant be personally served in the forum state.'5 In
the decades that followed, however, the growth and commercial
expansion of the country rendered Pennoyer's conception of per-
10. See REUVEN YARON, THE LAWS OF ESHNUNNA 118-19 (Magnes Press 1988) (1969).
One of the earliest known legal codes, the Code of Eshnunna, required plaintiffs to "shout"
or "speak" their cause of action. See id. at 127-28.
11. Aaron R. Chacker, Note, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International
Interlink, 48 VILL. L. REV. 597, 599 (2003) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). But see Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Amended Rule 4
and the Presumption of Jurisdiction, 14 REV. LITIG. 159, 160-63 (1994) (contending that
the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "proceed from the premise
that service of process is a pesky ministerial responsibility.").
12. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 ("[N]otice... [must] apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.");
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard."); Chacker, supra note 11, at 599 n.15 ("[T]he core func-
tion of service is to supply notice of the pendency of a legal action, in a manner and at a
time that affords the defendant a fair opportunity to answer the complaint and present
defenses and objections." (quoting Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996))).
13. Colby, supra note 2, at 339-40 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)); see also John M. Murphy III, Note, From Snail Mail to E-Mail:
The Steady Evolution of Service of Process, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 77
(2004).
14. See Burnham v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 616-18 (1990) (discussing the tran-
sition from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), to Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) ("[A] trend is clearly discern-
ible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other nonresidents.... attributable to the fundamental transformation of our nation-
al economy."); Colby, supra note 2, at 340, 344; see also Murphy, supra note 13, at 77-81
(providing a chronological discussion of personal jurisdiction cases).
15. 95 U.S. at 733.
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sonal jurisdiction unworkable.16 Accordingly, the Court in McDo-
nald v. Mabee found that delivery of summons to a defendant's
"last and usual place of abode" might be sufficient in some cir-
cumstances.17
The Court in International Shoe v. Washington established the
modern "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction and set
the standard that a particular form of substituted service is ade-
quate where it "gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be
actual."" The Court concluded that, on the facts of the case, send-
ing notice via registered mail was reasonably calculated to notify
the defendant of the suit.' 9
Not long after International Shoe, the Court issued a landmark
decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.20 In
Mullane, a trust company in New York had established a common
trust fund, and sought to settle its first account as common trus-
tee.21 The action concerned many beneficiaries, some of whom
were not residents of the State of New York, the situs of the ac-
tion.22 In compliance with the requirements of the applicable New
York Banking Law, the trust company provided notice only by
publication in a local newspaper.2 The notice set forth the "name
and address of the trust company, the name and the date of es-
tablishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all participat-
ing estates, trusts or funds."24
Mullane, special guardian and attorney for persons not appear-
ing or who had or might have an interest in the income of the
common trust fund, appeared specially to contest the constitu-
tional sufficiency of the notice and the statutory provisions for no-
tice.25 The New York Surrogate's Court held that "the notice re-
quired and given was sufficient," and entered a final decree
16. Colby, supra note 2, at 340-41.
17. 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
18. 326 U.S. at 320.
19. Id.
20. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
21. Id. at 309.
22. Id. The record did not disclose the exact number or residence of the beneficiaries.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 310.
25. Id. at 310-11.
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accepting the accounts. 26 The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals of the State of New York af-
firmed.27
On appeal, the issue considered by the Mullane Court was
whether the notice comported with Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process.2" The Court regarded the opportunity to be heard as the
"fundamental requisite of due process," and noted that the "right
to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that
the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to ap-
pear or default, acquiesce or contest."29 The Court acknowledged
that it had not committed itself to a formula for determining
when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must
meet, but announced what has become the constitutional stan-
dard for adjudging the adequacy of alternative means of service:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to
convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance.30
The Court concluded that "[t]he means employed must be such as
one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it."31 The Court offered one caveat: where no
available method of effectuating notice could satisfy the "reason-
ably calculated" standard, the form of service chosen need only be
"not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of
the feasible and customary substitutes."32
Applying those principles to the facts of the case, the Court
held that, for those beneficiaries "whose interests or whereabouts
could not with due diligence be ascertained," notice by publication
was constitutionally sufficient. 33 For the beneficiaries of known
26. Id. at 311 (citing In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S. 2d 397, 410
(1947)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 307.
29. Id. at 314.
30. Id. (internal citations omitted).
31. Id. at 315. The Court remarked, "[Pirocess which is a mere gesture is not due
process." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 317.
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places of residence, however, notice by publication was inade-
quate .
The "reasonably calculated" standard announced in Mullane
has provided the constitutional framework for notice for over fifty
years. 3 Various means of alternative service have passed consti-
tutional muster under this standard. 6 Under American law,
however, adequate notice requires not only compliance with con-
stitutional due process, but also compliance with the applicable
service of process statute.37
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs notice
for federal courts in the civil realm.3" The text of Rule 4 permits
service by: "(1) personal service; (2) mail; (3) means permitted by
federal law; (4) alternative forms of service; (5) means allowed
under state law; or (6) means allowed by the law of the country
where the summons is to be served or an internationally agreed
means of service." 9 Subsection (f)(3), which permits "other
means" of service directed by the court and not prohibited by in-
ternational agreement,40 "was designed to be a 'catch-all' to per-
mit service of process by means that are not listed explicitly in
the Federal Rules."41 Although the Rule "places a strong empha-
34. Id. at 318. The beneficiaries of known residence could easily have been reached via
more reliable means, such as the mails. Id. The Court's holding did not rest upon whether
the action should properly have been classified as in rem or as in personam. Id. at 312.
35. Chacker, supra note 11, at 604 & n.41 (collecting cases).
36. Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-Service: Ensuring the Integrity of International E-
Mail Service of Process, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285, 287-88 (2008); see, e.g., Int'l
Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 176-78 (2d Cir. 1979) (describing mail service of
process to defendant's last known address under former Rule 4(i)(1)(E)); Levin v. Ruby
Trading Corp., 248 F. Supp. 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (noting that ordinary mail to three
different addresses satisfies due process).
37. Weiss v. Glemp, 903 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Wash. 1995) (citing Thayer v. Edmonds,
503 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972)). Because notice is essential to commencing
litigation, "every American jurisdiction has codified its particular requirements for effec-
tuating proper notice." Chacker, supra note 11, at 599-600.
38. Chacker, supra note 11, at 600; see FED. R. CIV. P. 4. For an overview of Rule 4,
see 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1089.1 (3d ed. 2002).
39. Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing "You've Got Mail""m From Meaning 'You've Been
Served": How Service of Process by E-Mail Does Not Meet Constitutional Procedural Due
Process Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1125-26 (2005) (citing FED. R. Clv. P.
4(f)).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3).
41. Murphy, supra note 13, at 105.
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sis on the need to save costs,"42 it must be remembered that the
Constitution requires more than speed and efficiency.43
III. EVOLUTION OF SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process necessarily evolved from the days that re-
quired personal service in the forum state." Personal service,
which is effectuated "by delivery to the defendant of the summons
and complaint by a person authorized by law," is considered "the
most reliable manner of giving a defendant notice of a legal action
in which the defendant has an interest."45 Plaintiffs favor person-
al service due to its certainty, but it is often difficult to "achiev[e]
the physical contact between process server and defendant neces-
sary to comply with the requirements of applicable service of
process statutes."46
Because personal service is not always possible, the law has
expanded to permit, in certain circumstances, service by publica-
tion, mail, telex, facsimile, and e-mail.47 Courts have deemed de-
fendants on notice where "substituted" or "constructive" methods
of service have been employed.48 Where the defendant is a natural
person, substituted service is commonly effectuated by leaving
42. Frank Conley, Comment, :-) Service With A Smiley: The Effect of E-Mail and Other
Electronic Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 407, 411
(1997); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (governing waiver of formal service).
43. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).
44. Murphy, supra note 13, at 110.
45. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 234 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Ha-
nover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Personal service of written notice
within the jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceed-
ing.")).
46. Id. For example, in Weiss v. Glemp, a summons left on the windowsill of a rectory
did not comply with the state statutory requirement of personal service to the defendant
because the statute required that the papers be delivered to the defendant personally or
left at his abode with someone of suitable age and discretion. 903 P.2d 455, 456-57 (Wash.
1995). Service was held insufficient despite the fact that the process server was within
view and hearing of the defendant. Id. Conversely, other courts, "have held . . . that 'in
hand' delivery is not required to effectuate personal service." Tamayo, supra note 3, at 234
n.45 (collecting cases).
47. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 110; see also Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra
note 3, at 237-44 (discussing methods for effectuating substituted service). New technolo-
gies, however, have by no means supplanted more traditional modes of service such as
"tagging" a defendant within the forum state. Colby, supra note 2, at 344 n.28.
48. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 234. Commentators differ in
their use of the terms "substituted" and "constructive" in regard to notice. Id. at 237 n.69.
In this comment, as in Professor Tamayo's article, the terms will be used interchangeably
to connote any form of service other than personal service.
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papers at the defendant's home. 9 Though generally accepted, this
method poses problems, "such as identification of the defendant's
residence when the defendant occupies more than one home." °
Absent personal service, the Supreme Court has found that
service of process by certified or registered mail may be constitu-
tionally sufficient."' The federal rules and many state rules expli-
citly permit mail service. 2 Service by mail generally requires that
the carrier "obtain a manually executed signature from the de-
fendant and.., mail the return receipt bearing that signature to
the plaintiff, who must then file the return receipt with the
court." 3 "[Slervice of process through posting or publication often
provides less certainty" that the defendant will receive notice,
and thus has only been permitted under more limited circums-
tances. 54
As communication technologies evolved, litigants sought to
employ new technologies to effectuate notice.5" In the first of a
line of cases embracing technological innovations for service of
process, the court in New England Merchants National Bank v.
49. Id. at 237-38. Under the Federal Rules, such service requires that the summons
and complaint be left "at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of
suitable age and discretion who resides there." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(b).
50. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 238; see, e.g., Nat'l Dev. Co. v.
Triad Holding Corp., 930 F.2d 253, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding "sufficient indicia of
permanence" at defendant's New York dwelling despite defendant's contention that he
lived primarily in Saudi Arabia). Similar problems arise in the corporate context where
service is attempted upon "an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent au-
thorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(B).
For example, in Buckley & Co. v. Secretary of Labor, decided under then-Rule 4(d)(3), the
predecessor to 4(h)(1), a construction company shop superintendant who acted as the com-
pany's representative in other capacities was not authorized to receive service of process.
507 F.2d 78, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1975).
51. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 236 & n.59 (citing Mennonite Bd.
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354
(1927)).
52. Id. at 236; see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(ii) (individuals in foreign countries);
COLO. R. CIv. P. 4(g); MINN. R. Civ. P. 4.05; VT. R. CIv. P. 4(f). Additionally, plaintiffs
commonly use first-class mail for mailing complaints and requests for waiver of formal
service. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 237. Although such use of the
mails does not technically effect service, it may obviate the need for formal service alto-
gether. Id.
53. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 236.
54. Id. at 242-44.
55. Chacker, supra note 11, at 604. For a chronological breakdown of technological
developments in service of process, see id. at 604-14; Murphy, supra note 13, at 82-91;
Maria N. Vernace, Comment, E-Mailing Service of Process: It's a Shoe in!, 36 UWLA L.
REV. 274, 285-300 (2005) (discussing judicial decisions on internet service of process).
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Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co. authorized service
of process via telex.5 6 Although the case dealt specifically with te-
lex, the decision affirmed the principle that "new communication
technologies could effectuate notice within constitutional bounda-
ries." 7 In what would become an oft-cited passage for courts ana-
lyzing new technological applications, the court said:
Courts, however, cannot be blind to changes and advances in tech-
nology. No longer do we live in a world where communications are
conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam
ships. Electronic communication via satellite can and does provide
instantaneous transmission of notice and information. No longer
must process be mailed to a defendant's door when he can receive
complete notice at an electronic terminal inside his very office, even
when the door is steel and bolted shut.
5 8
Other courts soon followed suit. 9
In the wake of New England Merchants, commentators theo-
rized about whether the then-emerging technology of facsimile
could similarly effectuate proper notice. 0 "Despite the dearth of
case law on the constitutionality of notice through facsimile, nu-
merous courts have considered facsimile's application in other
procedural contexts."61 The court in Calabrese v. Springer Person-
nel of New York, Inc. permitted facsimile service of an order to
answer interrogatories.62 After noting widespread use of fax ma-
chines,63 Judge Lane remarked that perhaps, under a literal read-
ing of the statute,
56. 495 F. Supp. 73, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
57. Chacker, supra note 11, at 606.
58. New England Merchants, 495 F. Supp. at 81.
59. See, e.g., Cooper v. Church of Scientology of Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 784 (D. Mass.
1982) (permitting use of telex to serve notice upon an evasive defendant).
60. Chacker, supra note 11, at 607 & n.57 (collecting law review articles).
61. Id. at 608 n.62; see also Murphy, supra note 13, at 83. For example, "several juris-
dictions ... accommodate service of pleadings and other papers by electronic means, in-
cluding facsimile, upon [the] recipient's consent." Chacker, supra note 11, at 608 n.62; cf.
FED. R. CIv. P. 5(b)(2)(E) & (d)(3).
62. 534 N.Y.S.2d 83, 83-84 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988). Calabrese marked the first known
case permitting service via fax machine. See id.; see also Conley, supra note 42, at 423 (as-
serting the same).
63. Calabrese, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 83 ("[Fax] machines have been around for many years,
but recently they have become so sophisticated and user-friendly that they have become
overwhelmingly the method of choice for the transmission of documents in today's world.
Indeed their use has become so widespread that business stationery now commonly carries
a 'fax' telephone number in addition to an ordinary one, and, in common usage, 'fax' has
been converted into a verb as well as an adjective and noun.").
20091 1505
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[Tihere could now ensue controversy as to whether the recipient's of-
fice is open, whether anyone is in charge, and whether the fax ma-
chine is in a conspicuous place. I refuse, however, to engage in such
Augustinian folly. Of course the office is open when the fax machine
is receiving. If an operator is present, of course there is delivery. If
no operator is present, of course the fax machine, which is visited
regularly, is in a conspicuous place.
64
A number of states subsequently permitted "facsimile to play
some role in service of initial process."65
Another crucial decision in the evolution of service of process
came in In re International Telemedia Associates, Inc.6" In Inter-
national Telemedia Associates, upon plaintiff's motion, the court
authorized three forms of substituted service on an elusive defen-
dant under Rule 4(f)(3): facsimile transmission, e-mail, and mail
to the defendant's last known address." The court's approval of
service by fax and e-mail rested in large part on the fact that the
defendant commonly used and preferred electronic communica-
tion." Channeling New England Merchants, the court remarked,
"[C]ommunication by facsimile transmission and electronic mail
have now become commonplace in our increasingly global society.
The federal courts are not required to turn a blind eye to society's
embracement of such technological advances."69 Thus, Interna-
tional Telemedia Associates further endorsed the "use of new
communication technologies to effectuate notice. ""
Finally, under a rather unusual factual scenario, the court in
Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan approved alternate ser-
vice of process via television under Rule 4(f)(3). 7 The plaintiffs in
Smith had filed a complaint against The Islamic Emirate of Afg-
hanistan, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Osama Bin Laden for
deaths resulting from the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks.72 Af-
ter noting the flexibility inherent in Rule 4(f)(3), the court ap-
64. Id. at 84.
65. Chacker, supra note 11, at 608 n.62 (citing IDAHO R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); MONT. CODE
ANN. 25-3-501); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1l(b)(4)(i).
66. 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000). The case is also commonly referred to as
Broadfoot v. Diaz.
67. Id. at 722.
68. Id. at 721.
69. Id.
70. Chacker, supra note 11, at 610.
71. Nos. 01 CIV 10132(HB), 01 CIV 10144(HB), 2001 WL 1658211, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 26, 2001).
72. Id. at *1.
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proved service on Bin Laden and A1-Qaeda by publication in vari-
ous media outlets, including broadcasters such as Turkish CNN
and BBC World."8 Smith is the only known authority on record to
address the constitutionality of televised notice. 4
IV. E-MAIL
The Internet and e-mail have become "a part of everyday voca-
bulary and everyday life, both business and personal."75 E-mail is
not simply garnering use, but it is beginning to displace more
traditional modes of communication such as traditional mail, fax,
and telephone.7'6 As online communication took the world by
storm, commentators posited about the use of e-mail in litigation
processes.77
In time, the judiciary began to adapt the litigation process to
reflect these "revolutionary trends in information processing."7
Courts, both state and federal, implemented electronic filing sys-
tems;7 9 electronic documents gained an increasing role in evi-
dence; o discovery rules were adapted to permit electronic discov-
73. Id. at *3-4. The whereabouts of the defendants could not be determined, as Bin
Laden was then, and currently remains, the subject of an international manhunt. See id.
at *3.
74. Chacker, supra note 11, at 610.
75. Conley, supra note 42, at 414; see also Murphy, supra note 13, at 73. In 2000, an
estimated 1.6 billion non-commercial e-mails were sent out daily in the United States
alone. Murphy, supra note 13, at 74. An America Online survey found "that the average e-
mail user checks [e-mail roughly] five times [per] day, . . .and 59% of [people] who use
portable e-mail devices check [their e-mail] every time a new message arrives.. . ." David
Harsanyi, Survey Says: Wait, I Have an E-Mail, DENVER POST, July 27, 2007, at B-01,
available at 2007 WLNR 14443950 ("We're reading and writing e-mails in our cars, in our
bathrooms, at the park when our children play and at church.").
76. See Stefanie Scott, Firms Find Advantages in E-Mail, POST-CRESCENT (APPLETON,
WIS.), Aug. 27, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 9048717 (stating that over 80% of corpora-
tions are replacing mail with e-mail: 72% sent fewer faxes, and 45% made fewer phone
calls).
77. See Chacker, supra note 11, at 612.
78. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 227-28; see Colby, supra note 2,
at 375, 381-82.
79. Murphy, supra note 13, at 92-95. Nationwide implementation of the judiciary's
Case Management and Electronic Case Files system is nearly completed in the district
and bankruptcy courts and is advancing to the appellate courts. Case Manage-
ment/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF), http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf~about.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (explaining the system and reporting progress toward nation-
wide implementation).
80. Electronic evidence has been admitted in both civil and criminal contexts. See
Conley, supra note 42, at 416; Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 247-48.
For example, the court in Strauss v. Microsoft Corp. admitted into evidence lewd e-mail
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ery requests and discovery of computerized data;"1 and notions of
service expanded to encompass service via electronic means.8 2
The first known case permitting service of a judicial order by e-
mail came out of England in 1996.3 In the English case, Mr. Jus-
tice Newman of the Queens Bench granted a request by solicitors
to serve notice of an extraterritorial injunction via e-mail.' The
lawyers in the English case used an Internet service provider that
"ha[d] an option for notifying the sender ... when the recipient's
service provider . . . received the message" but did not have the
capacity to notify the sender "when the recipient actually read the
note." 5 The defendant, however, "proved that he had read the
message by responding to it, thus satisfying the substituted ser-
vice requirement."86 Notably, the English rule governing service
of documents was similar in language and effect to Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules in the United States.
messages sent by an employee editor to prove sex discrimination in the workplace. No. 91
Civ. 5928 (SWK), 1995 WL 326492, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995); see also United
States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass. 1997) (admitting e-mail contents as a
present sense impression); Lois Timnick, Judge Will Allow Race Evidence in King Case,
L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1991, at 1 (discussing admission of electronic messages written by
officers involved in the Rodney King beating).
81. Conley, supra note 42, at 415; see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (permitting parties to re-
quest that information such as computerized data be translated into useable form).
82. See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(D) (amended in 2001 to permit service of pleadings
and other papers by electronic means where the person being served expressly consents in
writing); FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e) (permitting district courts to adopt rules allowing electronic
filing); IND. TRIAL R. P. 5(F) (defining "filing with the court" in a manner allowing the fil-
ing of documents by all forms of electronic transmission, including facsimile). Congress
permits service of process via e-mail under the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). Also, "many federal circuits have adopted local rules
for the submission of electronic briefs, and some states even mandate the submission of
briefs by computer disk." Murphy, supra note 13, at 93.
83. Conley, supra note 42, at 408. For further discussion of the English case, see Ta-
mayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 244-46.
84. Conley, supra note 42, at 408. The order stated, "The Plaintiff do [sic] have leave
to serve notice of the Writ herein, and to serve the Affidavit and this Order ... by E-Mail,
at the number and addresses stated on the Writ herein." Paul Lambeth & Jonathan Coad,
Serving the Internet-Nowhere To Hide in Cyberspace from a Cyber Lawyer, CYBERSPACE
LAW, Sept. 1996, at 6-7, available at http://www.lectlaw.com/files/elw07.htm. The Order
was issued in sealed proceedings. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?, supra note 3, at 244
n.121.
85. Conley supra note 42, at 409-10.
86. Id. at 410.
87. Id. At that time, the Rules of the English Supreme Court provided: "Service of any
document [with noted exceptions] ... may be effected - (a) by leaving the document at the
proper address of the person to be served, or (b) by post, or (c) through a document ex-
change [involving a numbered box], or (ca) [sic] by FAX [sic] .... , or (d) in such other
manner as the Court may direct." Id. (quoting R. SUP. CT. 0. 65, p.5(1)). Order 65 under-
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Only three years later, an American court addressed electronic
service of process in Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com.88
When determining whether the plaintiffs had made a good faith
effort to identify and serve the defendant, the court in Seescandy
stated flatly that service via e-mail was "not sufficient to comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 9 The court provided
no analysis or citation to any authority.90
That same year, the court in WAWA, Inc. v. Christenson held
that Rule 4 did not permit the use of e-mail to serve notice on a
foreign defendant.9' The decision did not involve extensive analy-
sis; the court simply asserted that e-mail was "not an approved
method of service under" Rule 4.92 Although the court noted that
the Rules Committee had discussed and recommended a change
in Rule 4 to permit electronic transmission, the court concluded
that e-mail was not "a valid means for delivering a summons and
complaint."93
Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, however,
"ushered in the new era of international service of process via e-
mail."94 Although the court in International Telemedia Associates
authorized service of process via e-mail as one of three methods of
substituted process under Rule 4(f)(3),95 Rio "marked the first
federal appellate court assessment of the core issue underlying
service of process through electronic mail: procedural due
process."96
In light of the Ninth Circuit's "groundbreaking analysis"97 and
the potential impact of Rio, the case merits a somewhat detailed
discussion. In Rio, "Las Vegas hotel and casino operator Rio
went substantial revision in 1998; the provisions governing service are now located at
Rule 6.12.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. See WHITE BOOK cxviii (Sweet & Maxwell 2001).
88. See 185 F.R.D 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
89. Id.
90. See id. A few years before Seescandy, the court in Greebel v. FTP Software Inc.,
upheld notice of a class action that was sent via the Internet to print publishers and wire
services for circulation. 939 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (D. Mass. 1996).
91. No. Civ. A 99-1454, 1999 WL 557936, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 1999).
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id.
94. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 288 (citing Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
95. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
96. Chacker, supra note 11, at 620.
97. Id.
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Properties, Inc. ("RIO") sued Rio International Interlink ("RII"), a
[Costa Rican] Internet business entity, asserting various statuto-
ry and common law trademark infringement claims.""8 RIO first
attempted service of process by conventional means in the United
States.99 Unable to effect service domestically, RIO hired a pri-
vate investigator to determine RII's whereabouts in Costa Rica. 100
The investigator, however, "learned only that RII preferred com-
munication through its e-mail address, email@betrio.com, and re-
ceived snail mail ... at the IEC [its international courier] address
in Florida," which was not authorized to receive service. 10 1
Unable to serve RII by traditional means, RIO filed an emer-
gency motion to effectuate alternative service of process.' 2 RII
did not respond to RIO's motion.' The district court granted the
motion and, pursuant to Federal Rules 4(h)(2) and 4(f)(3), ordered
service of process on RII through mail to RII's attorney and IEC
and to RII directly via e-mail.0 4 RIO served RII in accordance
with "these court-sanctioned methods."'0 5 RII then filed a motion
to dismiss for insufficient service of process and want of personal
jurisdiction, but the district court denied its motion.'
The district court ultimately imposed sanctions and entered a
default judgment against RII. 7 RII appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, contesting the sufficiency of service, the district court's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction, and the entry of default judgment
and award of attorney's fees.' 8
98. Rio, 284 F.3d at 1012.
99. See id. at 1013. RII claimed a Florida address, but that address housed only IEC,
RII's international courier, which was not authorized to accept service on RII's behalf. Id.
IEC did, however, agree to forward the summons and complaint to RI. Id. RII received
the summons and complaint and consulted a Los Angeles attorney. Id. Following talks be-
tween RII's attorney and RIO, RIO requested that the attorney accept service for RII; the
attorney declined. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. "RII then filed its answer, denying RIO's allegations and asserting twenty-two
affirmative defenses." Id. RII subsequently refused to provide good faith answers to RIO's
discovery requests and interrogatories. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1014.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed. °9 The court examined the text of
Rule 4(f)(3) and accompanying advisory committee notes and con-
cluded that service of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither a "last
resort" nor "extraordinary relief," but rather "one means among
several which enables service of process on an international de-
fendant.""' Because the subparts of Rule 4(f) are not listed hie-
rarchically, the court concluded that "RIO need not have at-
tempted every permissible means of service of process before
petitioning the court for alternative relief.""' Rather, "RIO
needed only to demonstrate that the facts and circumstances of
the present case necessitated the district court's intervention.""' 2
Additionally, the court found that "service under Rule 4(f)(3)
must be (1) directed by the court; and (2) not prohibited by inter-
national agreement."" 8 The court concluded that "the district
court properly exercised its discretionary powers to craft alterna-
tive means of service" when RIO presented the court "with its in-
ability to serve an elusive international defendant.""'
The Ninth Circuit then addressed whether the selected alter-
native methods of service comported with due process."' The
court found that each alternative method of service ordered by
the district court-service through IEC, service upon the attor-
ney, and service directly to RII via e-mail-was reasonably calcu-
lated under these circumstances to apprise RII of the pendency of
the action and to afford it an opportunity to respond."6
Despite a dearth of authority condoning service of process over
the Internet or e-mail, the court concluded without hesitation
that service via e-mail was not only proper, but it was in fact the
method most likely to reach RIIY 7 Citing Mullane, the court rea-
soned that the Constitution does not require any particular
means of service of process, but only that the method selected be
reasonably calculated to afford notice and an opportunity to re-
109. Id. at 1023.
110. Id. at 1014-15.
111. Id. at 1014-16.
112. Id. at 1016.
113. Id. at 1014. Further, "[Als long as court-directed and not prohibited by an interna-
tional agreement, service of process ordered under Rule 4(f)(3) may be accomplished in
contravention to the laws of the foreign country." Id.
114. Id. at 1016.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1017.
117. Id.
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spond.11' The court stated that, "In proper circumstances, [Mul-
lane's] broad constitutional principle unshackles the federal
courts from anachronistic methods of service and permits them
entry into the technological renaissance."1 9 The court noted the
zealous embrace of communication via e-mail and the Internet in
the business community, and emphasized that RII utilized and
preferred communication via e-mail.'2 ° The court concluded that,
"[W]hen faced with an international e-business scofflaw, playing
hide-and-seek with the federal court, e-mail may be the only
means of effecting service of process."' 2 '
Although the court did approve service of process via e-mail,
the court noted some limitations. 122 Specifically, the court pointed
to the difficulty in confirming receipt and complying with verifica-
tion requirements, and noted that system compatibility problems
could make appending exhibits and attachments impossible in
some circumstances. 12
3
Ultimately, however, the court "[left] it to the discretion of the
district court to balance the limitations of e-mail service against
its benefits in any particular case."124 The court concluded that in
the instant case, "the district court performed the balancing test
admirably, crafting methods of service reasonably calculated un-
der the circumstances to apprise RII of the pendency of the ac-
tion. 1
25
Commentators pounced on Rio from all different angles.'26
Some heralded the decision,"' while others focused on infirmities
of the opinion and of e-service of process generally. 28 Commenta-
118. Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1017-18.
121. Id. at 1018. The court distinguished WAWA, Inc. on the grounds that the plaintiff
in Wawa "attempted to serve the defendant via e-mail absent a court order." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1018-19.
126. See, e.g., Chacker, supra note 11, at 598-99; Lewis, supra note 36, at 286; Heather
A. Sapp, You've Been Served! Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 493 (2003); Schreck, supra note 39, at 1123; Vernace, supra note 55, at
275.
127. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 36, at 301-02 (describing how the benefits of e-mail
service of process outweigh its burdens); Vernace, supra note 55, at 295.
128. See, e.g., Chacker, supra note 11, at 623 (i[Tihe Rio Properties court imparted a
troublesome legacy on future courts."); Schreck, supra note 39, at 1134-45 (discussing
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tors also split on Rio's application beyond e-mail: some contended
it was a fact-specific holding,129 while others saw it as a landmark
case presenting a "larger doctrine relevant to notice through any
modern technology."3 ° Notwithstanding any shortcomings, com-
mentators seemed to agree that, although Rio was only binding
on district courts within the Ninth Circuit, other courts would
look to the decision and likely follow suit.
131
Sure enough, at least two courts outside the Ninth Circuit
quickly cited to Rio. 32 In Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., the Western
District of New York similarly looked to Rule 4(f)(3) as an "inde-
pendent basis of service of process." 33 The Ryan court agreed
with Rio that a party "need not have attempted every permissible
means of service before petitioning for alternative relief," but
noted that district courts may, in their discretion, impose a
"threshold requirement for parties to meet before seeking the
court's assistance."34 The court required that parties seeking re-
lief under 4(f)(3) "show that they reasonably attempted to effec-
tuate service on the defendant(s) and that the circumstances are
such that the district court's intervention is necessary to obviate
the need" for unduly burdensome or futile attempts at service. 35
Satisfied by those conditions, the court addressed whether service
via e-mail comported with due process under Mullane.136 The
court, reasoning that the defendant conducted business via mail,
phone, fax, and e-mail, held that it was constitutionally permissi-
ble to authorize service on the defendant by regular mail, fax, or
e-mail.' 37 Notably, the defendant in Ryan was not as elusive as
the defendant in Rio. 35
technological problems associated with service of process by e-mail and how such service is
not permissible under the current Federal Rules).
129. Cf. Sapp, supra note 126, at 499 (explaining that Rio did not answer whether e-
mail was a proper method of serving U.S.-based defendants).
130. Chacker, supra note 11, at 626.
131. See, e.g., id. at 625; Colby, supra note 2, at 364.
132. Chacker, supra note 11, at 626.
133. No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002).
134. Id. (quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.
2002)).
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Similarly, in Hollow v. Hollow, the court approved service di-
rected to the defendant's last known e-mail address and service
by international and standard mail. 139 Hollow, the defendant in a
divorce action, had fled to Saudi Arabia. 4° The defendant con-
tacted his wife and children only by e-mail; in one e-mail, he re-
marked, "I am a resident of Saudi Arabia and there's nothing an-
yone can do to me here." 41 The court noted the potential difficulty
in verifying receipt of e-mail, but concluded that e-mail was per-
missible under the circumstances because it was the defendant's
sole method of communicating with the plaintiff. 141
Despite the sweeping picture painted by Ryan and Hollow, not
all post-Rio courts have approved service of process via e-mail in
the cases before them.1 43 First, approval of e-service is contingent
upon the filing of a petition for alternative service under Rule
4(f)(3).14 4 Second, courts balance a number of factors, including
the defendant's elusiveness, familiarity or preference for electron-
ic communication, and whether the defendant conducted business
or communicated frequently by Internet or e-mail. 14 Courts have
not attributed weights to the various factors or stated whether
certain factors were required; rather, the courts employed the
139. 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
140. Id. at 705.
141. Id. at 705, 708.
142. Id. at 708.
143. Compare D'Acquisto v.. Triffo, No. 05-C-0810, 2006 WL 44057, at *2 (E.D. Wis.
Jan. 6, 2006) (authorizing e-mail service of process); Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231
F.R.D. 483,488 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (same); Popular Enters., LLC v. Webcom Media Group,
Inc., 225 F.R.D. 560, 563 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ.
10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004) (directing service via e-mail
pursuant to section 308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules); Viz Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Redsun, No. C0104235JF, 2003 WL 23901766, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2003) (ser-
vice by e-mail is constitutionally sufficient); FTC v. Zuccarini, No. 01CV4854, 2001 WL
34131411, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2001) (permitting a court order to be served via e-mail);
Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708; with Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL
696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (rejecting service via e-mail because plaintiff did
not present evidence that defendant maintained the website, monitored an e-mail address,
or would otherwise receive the message); Pfizer, Inc. v. Domains By Proxy, No. Civ.A.3:04
CV 741(SR.), 2004 WL 1576703, at *1-*2 (D. Conn. July 13, 2004) (service by e-mail not
likely to reach defendant and conventional service not impossible).
144. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 295. Courts have consistently recognized that Rule
4(f) does not create a "hierarchy of service mechanisms." Id.; see also Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio
Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. Lewis, supra note 36, at 296.
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benefit-burden balancing prescribed by Rio on a case-by-case
basis.14
6
Notably, even courts that did not authorize service by e-mail
employed Rio's balancing test.14 ' As one commentator aptly noted,
"The fact that the courts rejected e-mail service is immaterial; ra-
ther, what is important is that they applied the Ninth Circuit's
test."14 In sum, commentators and courts alike are recognizing a
trend in universal electronic service.
149
V. E-SERVICE ON PARTIES ABROAD
Service of process requirements have, in a sense, "developed in-
to a procedural loophole through which wily defendants can avoid
litigation" in federal courts through a game of "hide and seek."'
146. Id.
147. Id. at 297-98.
148. Id.
149. Colby, supra note 2, at 337.
150. Chacker, supra note 11, at 597; see also Aries Ventures Ltd. v. AXA Finance S.A.,
No. 86 CIV 4442 (WCC), 1990 WL 37814, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1990) (finding insuffi-
cient service of process where defendant failed to return the acknowledgement required for
waiver and defendant could not be served by any other method under the applicable rule);
Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705, (Sup. Ct. 2002) (defendant attempted to evade
service by fleeing to Saudi Arabia). The following excerpt, taken from the deposition of an
evasive defendant who gave up his residence to avoid notice, illustrates the point:
Q. What is your current address?
A. 957 Bristol Pike, Apartment D-6, Andalusia, Pennsylvania, 19020.
Q. Is that where you currently reside?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. Where do you currently reside?
A. I don't have-that's my legal address. I really don't have a permanent address at this
time.
Q. Where do you currently reside?
A. Right now I am staying at the Millennium Hotel in New York.
Q. When you are not in New York for a deposition, where do you live? Where have you
lived in the past two weeks?
A. I have been living in various places.
Q. What are the various places that you have been living?
A. Friends' places. You know, that type of thing. Different hotels.
Q. Do you live in Pennsylvania?
A. I don't know. I don't have a permanent address so I can live anywhere. I don't live
anywhere right now. I can't give you a permanent address.
Elecs. Boutique Holding Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765, at
*15 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2001).
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Such difficulties in effectuating service are especially salient
where plaintiffs attempt to serve foreign defendants.151
Rule 4(f) sets forth the methods of service for individuals out-
side the United States.15 2 Subsection (f)(1) permits service by
means established by international agreement, so long as such
means are "reasonably calculated" to put the defendant on no-
tice.' 3 Where no treaty exists or where a treaty is silent on the
issue, subsection (f)(2) permits service by any method provided by
foreign local law, letters rogatory, or, where not prohibited by lo-
cal law, personal service or "any form of mail" dispatched by the
clerk of court and accompanied with a signed receipt.1 54 Subsec-
tion (f)(3) permits service by "other means" so long as those
means are directed by the court and are not prohibited by inter-
national agreement.'55
"Courts have permitted electronic service of process on parties
located outside the United States pursuant to [Rule] 4(h)(2) and
[Rule] 4(f)(3) where some combination of the following circum-
151. See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
Service of process abroad has been called "one of the most challenging [problems] that a
district court can be called upon to face." Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 458
(S.D. Fla. 1998).
152. Colby, supra note 2, at 347. Rule 4(f) provides:
Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual-other than a minor, an
incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed-may be served
at a place not within any judicial district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably
calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Con-
vention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments;
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international
agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that
is reasonably calculated to give notice:
(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that coun-
try in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;
(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or
letter of request; or
(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by:
(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the indi-
vidual personally; or
(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the
individual and that requires a signed receipt; or
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the
court orders.
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1).
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2).
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3).
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stances were present": (1) "the proposed methods are reasonably
calculated to provide the defendant with notice"; (2) "traditional
methods of service are, or are likely to prove, futile or inade-
quate"; (3) the defendant is difficult to find because his identity is
unknown, his whereabouts are unknown, he is a moving target,
or he is actively evading service; and (4) the defendant has used
electronic methods of communication with the plaintiff or with
customers. 156
When evaluating petitions under Rule 4(f)(3), courts commonly
look to the Hague Convention "because of the large number of
signatory nations."57 Because the Convention was drafted in
1965, it makes no express references to electronic media such as
e-mail, Internet, or fax machines.15 Rather, the convention pro-
vides for service through a designated "Central Authority,"15 9
through diplomatic channels,'160 through postal channels, 16' and
by any method permitted by the internal laws of the country
where service is made. 162 Additionally, signatory countries may
ratify the provisions of the convention subject to any conditions or
objections to specific articles that it chooses to include. 6 3
Modern application of the terms of the Hague Convention
brought strong disagreement amongst courts, but "there is a
trend toward recognition of the broader interpretation" of accept-
able methods of service under the existing wording.6 4 The stated
156. Colby, supra note 2, at 370-71. Rule 4(h)(2) authorizes service of process on busi-
ness entities outside the United States via the same methods of service permissible for
individuals under 4(f), with the exception of personal delivery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2).
157. Jonathan W. Fountain, Service of Process Abroad, 16 NEV. LAW. 10, 11 (2008).
158. Charles T. Kotuby, Jr., International Anonymity: The Hague Conventions on Ser-
vice and Evidence and Their Applicability to Internet-Related Litigation, 20 J.L. & COM.
103, 111 (2000).
159. See Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters, arts. 2-6, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
160. Id. art. 8.
161. Id. art. 10.
162. Id. art. 19.
163. Id. art. 21.
164. Conley, supra note 42, at 414. For example, "the Special Commission Report on
the Operation of the Hague Service Convention and a United States Department of State
Opinion have stated that Article 10(a) does provide for service by mail." Uppendahl v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (W.D. Ky. 2003). But courts have nonetheless
split on whether the Convention permits service of process via mail. Compare Sibley v.
Alcan, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (permitting service of process by
registered mail under Article 10(a)), with Uppendahl, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 534 ("The court
simply cannot alter the text of the treaty to add matters not contained therein."). The di-
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goal of the Convention is to improve the organization of mutual
judicial assistance for the purpose of service of process by simpli-
fying and expediting the procedure." 5 At least one commentator
has argued that Article 10(a) could permit service by e-mail to the
extent that the term "postal channels" is interpreted to include e-
mail.166 As another commentator put it, "[I]f [the Hague Conven-
tion's] letter is to be interpreted alongside its general spirit, as
well as according to generally accepted definitions, Article 1 will
most likely permit service upon electronic addresses." 67
Indeed, a 1999 Special Commission of the Hague Convention
adopted this view."6 ' Commission V, which generally reviewed
service abroad, considered transmission by electronic means.'69
The Commission recommended that the transmissions in Article
10 be carried out by electronic means, provided they meet a set of
enumerated security requirements. 7 ° Compliance with the secu-
rity requirements would entail: confidentiality, integrity, inalte-
rability, ability to identify the sender, keeping records of the ex-
act date of dispatch and receipt, and that the technology be
vergence of opinion is based upon the interpretation of the term "send." Some courts hold
that "send" encompasses "service," and thus have permitted service of process by mail.
See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986). Other courts, however,
did not construe "send" to mean "service" because subparagraphs (b) and (c) employ the
term "service." See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp. 889 F.2d 172, 173-74 (8th Cir.
1989); Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
165. Hague Convention, supra note 159, pmbl.
166. Colby, supra note 2, at 352 n.60.
167. Murphy, supra note 13, at 107 (quoting Kotuby, supra note 158, at 114).
168. See Yvonne A. Tamayo, Catch Me if You Can: Serving United States Process on an
Elusive Defendant Abroad, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211, 240 (2003) [hereinafter Tamayo,
Catch Me if You Can].
169. See CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT NO. 7 ON ELECTRONIC DATA
INTERCHANGE, INTERNET AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 27 (2000), available at http://www.
hcch.net/upload/wop/gen-pd7e.pdf [hereinafter ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE].
170. Id. ("In order to ensure rapid and effective communication ... for... the subsidi-
ary transmissions in Article 10, the Commission recommends that these transmissions
should be carried out by electronic means, provided they meet the following security re-
quirements. The technique used to send the documents by electronic means should guar-
antee the confidentiality of the message (ensure, through cryptographic or other methods,
that the message sent cannot be intercepted by another person), the integrity of the mes-
sage (ensure that the message is not broken up in the course of despatch), the inalterabili-
ty of the message (ensure that no change can be made to the message, either by the ad-
dressee or by any other person). The technique should also make it possible to identify
beyond doubt the sender of the message. In addition, an irrefutable record should be kept
of the exact date of despatch and receipt of the message. Finally, in order to be productive
and effective the technology must be operational at any time (avoiding overload, known as
spam in technical language.")) (emphasis in original).
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operational at any time.171 Ultimately, the Commission concluded,
"[T]here is no doubt that transmission of documents by electronic
means would significantly enhance the usefulness and effective-
ness of the Convention .... [O]pening the Convention to electron-
ic means of communication in this way does not call for a formal
revision of the Convention."'72
Regardless of whether the terms of the Hague Convention ex-
plicitly authorize electronic service, they do not prohibit service of
process via e-mail, which might alone be sufficient under a Rule
4(f)(3) petition-the Rule requires only that the method chosen
not be prohibited by international agreement. 173 The advisory
committee notes for Rule 4(f)(3) confirm the point, stating that
"the court may direct a special method of service not explicitly au-
thorized by international agreement if not prohibited by the
agreement." 74
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Ha-
gue Convention "pre-empts inconsistent methods of service pre-
scribed by state law in all cases to which it applies," but that it
applies only when serving parties abroad.1 7 1 In other words, to the
extent that a court would construe electronic service as effecting
171. Id.
172. Id. at 28. In regard to revising the Convention, the Commission noted,
The use of electronic means to ensure the proper working of the Convention
poses few problems in the sense that the wording of the clauses concerned is
neutral as to the communication techniques to be used. It is this very absence
of any reference to a specific technique which makes it possible now to take
account of the progress made in means of communication. Moreover, the use
of means of communication as rapid and simple as electronic mail reflects two
fundamental aims of the Convention, which are to bring the document in
question "to the actual knowledge of the addressee in due time to enable the
defendant to prepare a defence" and to "simplify the method of transmission
of these documents from the requesting country to the country addressed."
Id. at 27-28.
173. Lewis, supra note 36, at 300; see also Colby, supra note 2, at 352-53.
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) advisory committee's note (1993); see also Sinclair, supra
note 11, at 163 ("In the international sphere, the 1993 amendments... free courts and liti-
gants to invent and experiment with new means of serving process"). As some courts have
noted, service of process ordered under Rule 4(f)(3) may in fact contravene laws of the for-
eign country, so long as they are court-directed and not prohibited by international agree-
ment. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). How-
ever, it should be noted that if a U.S. judgment requires enforcement abroad, it must
comply with that country's laws. Tamayo, Catch Me if You Can, supra note 168, at 235-36
(2003).
175. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699, 707-08 (1988).
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notice domestically, the Hague Convention would be inapplica-
ble. 17
6
VI. FACEBOOK
In accordance with the framework set forth above, if service of
process via Facebook is to be permitted under federal law, it must
comport with (a) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (b) due
process. Both requirements are addressed below.
A. Rule 4
Courts have held that service of process can be effectuated by
electronic means when foreign defendants are evasive. 177 At least
one commentator has suggested that electronic service should be
permitted in domestic cases, even though doing so would require
amending the current Federal Rules.178 Absent an amendment to
the Federal Rules, the only logical prong under which service of
process via Facebook might suffice is Rule 4(f).
Subsection (f)(1) permits service on a foreign individual "by any
internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calcu-
lated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Con-
vention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Doc-
uments."'79 The Hague Convention, written some forty years ago,
obviously does not expressly authorize service of process via social
networking sites.8 ° Further, whereas service via e-mail could ar-
guably be permitted under Article 10's "postal channels" provi-
sion,"' it is doubtful that a message sent or posted on an online
social networking site could ever be construed to fall under this
provision.
176. See Colby, supra note 2, at 353 n.62 (citing Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 707-08).
177. See supra Parts III-V.
178. See Colby, supra note 2, at 372-82. Colby suggests that the following provision be
added to Rule 4(e): "(3) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
individual via electronic means such as electronic mail or facsimile where directed by the
court." Id. at 376. He contends that proposed Rule 4(e)(3) should be coupled with a corres-
ponding amendment to Rule 4(h)(1). Id. at 376-77. Full examination of whether the Rules
should be amended to expressly permit service via electronic means is beyond the scope of
this article.
179. FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(f)(1).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 158-64.
181. See Colby, supra note 2, at 352 n.60.
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Although the Hague Commission endorsed electronic service
and broad interpretations to favor developing technology, the
Commission pointed to a number of criteria to ensure security.
Service via Facebook, in its present form, would likely fail at least
on the prong requiring "an irrefutable record ... of the exact date
of despatch [sic] and receipt."'s2 Facebook currently lacks the re-
turn receipt features that are increasingly available for e-mail
messages. 183
Rule 4(f)(2), which governs in the absence of international
agreement or where an international agreement permits but does
not specify other means, authorizes methods of service that are
reasonably calculated to give notice:
(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that
country in an action its courts of general jurisdiction; (B) as the for-
eign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of re-
quest; or (C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by (i) de-
livering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
individual personally; or (ii) using any form of mail that the clerk
addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed
receipt. 184
There is no indication that service via social networking sites
has been prescribed by any foreign country's law for service in its
courts of general jurisdiction. Perhaps a foreign authority could
direct service of process by Facebook in response to a letter roga-
tory or letter of request, satisfying Rule 4(f)(2)(B). 8 5 But as to
subsection (f)(2)(C), regardless of whether any foreign country
prohibits service of process through Facebook, service via Face-
book would neither constitute "deliver[y] ... to the individual
personally," nor "any form of mail that the clerk addresses...
and that requires a signed receipt."" 6 Thus, service of process un-
der Rule 4(f)(2) would likely fail, except perhaps under subsection
(f)(2)(B) as noted above.
The prong of Rule 4(f) that would most reasonably permit ser-
vice of process via Facebook appears to be Rule 4(f)(3)'s provision
182. See ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE, supra note 169, at 27 (emphasis in original).
183. This is not to say, however, that Facebook could not or will not upgrade to include
such features in due time. As with all technology, Facebook features will likely improve in
the future. Cf Lewis, supra note 36, at 302 (stating the same in regard to e-mail).
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2).
185. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2)(B).
186. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(i) & (ii).
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allowing "other means."18 ' Relevant here is the Ninth Circuit's
guidance that "service under Rule 4(f)(3) must be (1) directed by
the court; and (2) not prohibited by international agreement."'88
The fact that the Hague Convention does not expressly permit
service of process through social networking sites is not detrimen-
tal; the Convention does not expressly permit service through
other technological means such as fax and e-mail, but these me-
thods have been approved by a number of courts and were even
endorsed by the Hague Commission. 9 The Rule requires only
that the methods not be prohibited by the international agree-
ment. And again, "as long as court-directed and not prohibited by
an international agreement, service of process ordered under
Rule 4(f)(3) may be accomplished in contravention of the laws of
the foreign country."'9 ° Moreover, in the case of an extremely elu-
sive defendant whose exact whereabouts abroad are unknown,
analysis of the terms of the Hague Convention would arguably be
wholly unnecessary-Article 1 of the Convention makes clear that
the "Convention shall not apply where the address of the person
to be served with the document is not known."19' Provided that a
plaintiff sought and attained prior court approval, the Federal
Rules may very well permit service of process via Facebook under
Rule 4(f)(3)'s "other means" provision.
B. Due Process
In order to pass muster under the Due Process Clause as inter-
preted by Mullane and its progeny, service of process via Face-
book must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and af-
ford them an opportunity to present their objections."192 As the
Australian case approving service via Facebook in December 2008
appears to be a world-first,193 there is an obvious lack of authority
on point for any U.S. court that might encounter this issue.
187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
188. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002).
189. See, e.g., Rio, 284 F.3d at 1018; Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E(F),
2002 WL 1628933, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002); In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245
B.R. 713, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002).
190. Rio, 284 F.3d at 1014.
191. Hague Convention, supra note 159, art. 1.
192. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
193. See supra note 1.
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Courts that have upheld as constitutional service of process
through new communication technologies generally have begun
by noting the widespread societal embrace of the technology in
other facets of life.194 In theory, this should have virtually no
bearing on whether service is upheld in a given case because due
process analyses in this context are, by nature, fact specific. In
other words, the fact that the technology is widely employed in
the community at large does not entail that it is reasonably calcu-
lated to provide the particular defendant notice. What is good for
the goose is not always good for the gander.
Nonetheless, even assuming that widespread use plays a role
in the court's decision, Facebook could reasonably be taken as
widespread enough to gain approval. The site boasts over 120 mil-
lion users worldwide195 and began translating its site into differ-
ent languages in 2008 to broaden its user base.'96 Political candi-
dates, including President Barack Obama, have utilized Facebook
to rally support.'97 About 80,000 small businesses already have
profiles on Facebook, and the credit card giant Visa recently
launched a campaign to encourage businesses to join the social
network. 98 Facebook has even launched applications enabling us-
ers to access their accounts from portable devices such as Black-
Berrys, Smartphones, and iPhones.'99 In short, Facebook use is
booming, and users can access their accounts twenty-four hours a
194. See, e.g., Rio, 284 F.3d at 1017 ("Although communication via email and over the
Internet is comparatively new, such communication has been zealously embraced within
the business community."); Calabrese v. Springer Personnel of N.Y., Inc., 534 N.Y.S.2d 83,
83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) ("[Fax] machines . . . have become so sophisticated and user-
friendly that they have become overwhelmingly the method of choice for the transmission
of documents in today's world.").
195. See Facebook Wins Spain Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 25, 2008, at C3; Ellen
Lee, Facebook Beat MySpace in May, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2008, at C1.
196. Lee, supra note 195, at C1.
197. See Donna Cassata, Enthusiasm Doesn't Translate to Votes: Young People Rally
Behind Candidates Early But Many Don't Go to The Polls, Statistics Show, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 2007, at A9.
198. Visa Helps Firms Pay for Ads on Facebook; Credit Card Giant Hopes Venture Will
Lure Clients, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2008, at C3.
199. See Ryan Kim, Facebook Extends Reach with BlackBerry Program, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 25, 2007, at C6. "[E]xperts in England released a study claiming that BlackBerry de-
vices can be so addictive than owners may soon need to seek treatment comparable to that
given to drug users and sex addicts." David Harsanyi, Survey Says: Wait, I Have an E-
Mail, DENVER POST, July 27, 2007, at B1.
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day, seven days per week, whether at home, at the office, or even
in the car.2"'
The due process reasonableness analysis set forth by the Ninth
Circuit in Rio requires a benefit-limitation balancing.20' The bene-
fits of service of process via Facebook are much akin to the ad-
vantages associated with e-mail-sending messages through Fa-
cebook is fast, easy, and inexpensive. For an elusive defendant
with an unknown e-mail address, Facebook could be the only
means by which to notify the defendant of action. 0 2 In the context
of service of process via e-mail, courts have frequently looked to
the defendant's familiarity or preference for electronic communi-
cation.20 3 Given that a number of business entities now direct
would-be customers to visit their Facebook or MySpace pages, a
persuasive plaintiff could convince a court that a corporate defen-
dant has a preference for such communication. Directing patrons
to a Facebook page where they have options to send messages to
the entity could be analogized to a company who directs patrons
to a website where they have options to send messages to the
company via e-mail.
At least one commentator has argued that e-mail provides
greater assurance than other methods of service that the defen-
dant will actually be apprised of notice, noting that, "[TJ]nlike
200. Facebook use in the workplace has even caused a loss in office productivity. "Re-
search by Computerweekly.com found that 63% of organisations were planning to monitor
or limit staff access to [sites such as Facebook and MySpace] over the next six months, and
17% intended to ban their use entirely" because of lost productivity. Cath Everett, Career
Moves, COMPUTER WKLY., Mar. 11, 2008. Another survey found that nineteen percent of
workers questioned visited social networking sites while on the job. Id.
201. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002). This
comment assumes that courts will continue to employ the test developed by the Rio court
despite the fact that Rio is only binding authority for lower courts within the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Mr. Lewis has argued that, while service of process via e-mail may be a viable way to
effectuate service on defendants located outside of the United States, "the test must be
more exacting than the broad balancing test of the Rio court. See Lewis, supra note 36, at
285. Mr. Lewis proposed a three-part test to ensure the integrity of service of process in-
ternationally: "(1) a prima facie showing by the plaintiff that traditional means of service
have proved impractical; [ ] (2) "a showing by the plaintiff that service to this particular e-
mail address is reasonably reliable;" and (3) proper consideration by the court of non-
mandatory factors such as the extent to which traditional means of service have failed, the
defendant's conductlelusiveness, whether the defendant is a business entity operating in
e-commerce, and other necessary and material factors that arise in specific cases. Id. at
302-06.
202. But see Schreck, supra note 39, at 1145 (arguing that the mere fact that "e-mail
may be the only means of informing a defendant of an action does not necessarily mean
that it satisfies due process" per Mullane).
203. Lewis, supra note 36, at 296.
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documents delivered by substituted service of process to someone
other than the defendant, notice sent to a defendant's e-address
has no potential for post arrival physical movement and will re-
main in the defendant's mailbox until retrieved, thereby eliminat-
ing the risk of misplacement." 24 A comparable argument can be
made for messages sent via Facebook. °5
As promising as the benefits of service of process via Facebook
might appear to be, the limitations are more severe than those
associated with e-mail. The Ninth Circuit in Rio noted the diffi-
culty in confirming receipt of e-mail messages, complying with
verification requirements, and appending exhibits and attach-
ments.20 6 A number of commentators have elaborated on further
limitations associated with e-mail.27 Return receipts have gar-
nered most of the attention, as commentators note that mere re-
ceipt does not necessarily mean that the message was actually
read, and that return receipts are unable to provide the identity
of the person who actually opens the e-mail message.2 8 Other
problems include the fact that many e-mail users maintain sever-
al e-mail accounts, e-mail inboxes often have limited storage ca-
pacity, and there is currently no way to determine whether an at-
tachment has been read.20 9
Some commentators have suggested that, with the advent of
improved return receipt features, confirmation of receipt is not as
problematic as the Rio court suggested.210 However, no such fea-
ture currently exists for Facebook. At first glance, this might ap-
pear fatal to an attempt to serve process through Facebook. But
the Hollow court concluded e-mail was permissible, notwithstand-
ing the difficulty in verifying receipt, because it was the defen-
204. See Tamayo, supra note 3, at 256.
205. It might not be wholly accurate, however, to contend that notice sent to a defen-
dant's e-mail address will remain there until retrieved. Many e-mails are deleted without
ever being opened for a variety of reasons, including the abundance of spam mail and the
threat of computer viruses. See Schreck, supra note 39, at 1136-40. Facebook arguably
fairs better than e-mail on these points because user inboxes are not bombarded with
spain mail.
206. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
207. See Schreck, supra note 39, at 1134.
208. Id. at 1134-36; see also Lewis, supra note 36, at 301.
209. Lewis, supra note 36, at 301; Schreck, supra note 39, at 1140.
210. See Colby, supra note 2, 363 n.138. There are in fact companies that now special-
ize in providing service of process documents via e-mail. See Schreck, supra note 39, at
1135 n.108 (discussing the companies Proof of Service-electronic ("PoS-e") and ReadNoti-
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dant's sole method of communicating with the plaintiff.21' None-
theless, if Facebook, whose founders were reportedly thrilled with
the Australian court's decision to permit service through its
site,212 implemented a reliable return receipt feature, effectuating
service through Facebook under American law would become
much more plausible.213
One major difficulty in effectuating constitutional notice
through Facebook might be identifying the defendant-i.e., prov-
ing that the person behind the profile contacted is actually the de-
fendant.1 4 In order to register and maintain a Facebook profile, a
user need only enter his or her name, e-mail address, sex, date of
birth, and create a password. 215 A profile should, in theory, ac-
tually be that of the registrant because the Terms of Use require
users to:
(a) provide accurate, current and complete information ... as may be
prompted by any registration forms on the Site... (b) maintain the
security of [his or her] password and identification; (c) maintain and
promptly update the Registration Data, and any other information
[he or she] provide[s] to [Facebook], to keep it accurate, current and
complete; and (d) be fully responsible for all use of [his or her] ac-
count and for any actions that take place using [his or her] ac-
count.
216
The Terms of Use, however, include a large disclaimer to the ef-
fect that "Facebook does not pre-screen or approve Facebook pag-
211. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
212. Rod McGuirk, Australia OKs Facebook for Serving Lien Notice, IT WORLD, Dec. 16,
2008, http://www.itworld.com/node/59345.
213. Commentators would likely continue to attack return receipt features on the
grounds that mere confirmation of delivery or receipt does not establish that the recipient
actually read the message. But "a defendant's assertion that she did not read an electronic
notice that was otherwise properly delivered may be rebuffed by the legal presumption
that the defendant will read the contents of notice properly served." Tamayo, Are You Be-
ing Served?, supra note 3, at 256.
214. Cf. Christopher Maag, When the Bullies Turned Faceless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2007, at 9-9 (discussing the infamous cyberbullying case in which neighborhood mother
Lori Drew created a MySpace profile under the name "Josh Evans" to harass a thirteen-
year-old girl).
215. See Facebook Homepage, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
216. Facebook Terms of Use, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Apr. 9,
2009). Similar provisions govern registrants of Facebook Pages for commercial or other
entities. Id. ("Facebook Pages are special profiles used solely for commercial, political, or
charitable purposes. You may not set up a Facebook Page on behalf of another individual
or entity unless you are authorized to do so. This includes fan Facebook Pages, as well as
Facebook Pages to support or criticize another individual or entity.").
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es, and cannot guarantee that a Facebook page was actually
created and is being operated by the individual or entity."217
Ease in identifying the defendant could vary drastically from
case to case because Facebook users control the amount and qual-
ity of information presented on their pages. In the Australian
case, counsel convinced the judge that the profiles were those of
the defendants by pointing to identifying information such as
name and date of birth within the profiles, and by confirming the
relationship of the co-defendants using Facebook's friend lists. 21
Depending on the information available, a judge could reasonably
be convinced that the profile is in fact that of the defendant.
The inability to attach documents is also problematic for at-
tempting service of process through Facebook. As of this writing,
Facebook users can send only hyperlinks and messages; they are
unable to send attachments through the site. Courts evaluating
service of process by e-mail have specifically pointed to the diffi-
culty and inability to attach documents when addressing limita-
tions of the technology, 219 and service though Facebook would en-
counter severe resistance on this ground.
Although attempted service through Facebook obviously has its
flaws, it should be remembered that flaws and limitations are not
unique to service through technological means. Other more tradi-
tional means of service certainly have their flaws as well.22 ° Ma-
nual delivery via postal service is vulnerable to human error, re-
sulting in lost mail and misdeliveries. 221 Notice by publication can
be misprinted,222 and courts have consistently noted the slim
chances that modern day defendants will ever actually receive no-
tice by publication.223 Moreover, the standard is not that the de-
fendant actually receive and read such notice, but rather that the
service be "reasonably calculated" to apprise the defendant of ac-
tion.224 If service through Facebook is coupled with attempts
217. Id.
218. See Towell, supra note 1.
219. See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
220. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 302.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950).
224. See id. at 319-20.
20091
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
through other means, the likelihood of satisfying due process in-
creases. 225
In sum, while service through Facebook should not be touted as
a prime method for service of process, in limited circumstances,
courts may consider it to be permissible under Rule 4(f)(3) and
"reasonably calculated" per Mullane.
VII. CONCLUSION
"Technological advancement often presents difficult barriers for
courts to overcome in the application of traditional law," but ser-
vice of process is "so fundamental to the operation of law that his-
torically [it has] been more open to adaptability and change."226
Courts are beginning to find electronic service constitutionally
permissible under Mullane,2 7 and the trend toward electronic
service is "a logical step forward in the evolution of civil proce-
dure and reflects the popular use of new technologies in common
communication. '22' Facebook is one such new technology.
The Australian case permitting service of a default judgment
via Facebook foreshadows future attempts to employ social net-
working sites to effectuate legal ends. As this comment illu-
strates, attempted service of process through Facebook may very
well be permissible under Rule 4(f)(3) for serving foreign defen-
dants, and such service does not appear to constitute a per se due
process violation, no matter how narrow the circumstances per-
mitting such service might be. Necessity, the mother of invention,
has frequently been the catalyst for adapting the law to imple-
ment new technologies, 2 9 and if a situation arises in which a
message sent via Facebook is the only available means to serve
an elusive defendant abroad, the law might, in due time, adapt
accordingly.
Andriana L. Shultz
225. Lewis, supra note 36, at 291-92.
226. Conley, supra note 42, at 417.
227. Colby, supra note 2, at 380.
228. Conley, supra note 42, at 407.
229. See id. at 421.
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